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Abstract 
 
Drawing upon a national database of unimplemented planning permissions and 18 in-depth case 
studies, this paper provides both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the phenomenon of stalled 
sites in England.  The practical and conceptual difficulties of classifying sites as stalled are critically 
reviewed.  From the literature, it is suggested that planning permission may not be implemented due 
to lack of financial viability, strategic behaviour by landowners and house-builders and other 
problems associated with the development process.  Consistent with poor viability, the analysis of the 
national database indicates that a substantial proportion of the stalled sites is high density apartment 
development and/or is located in low house value areas.  The case studies suggest that a combination 
of interlinked issues may need to be resolved before a planning permission can be implemented.  
These include; the sale of the land to house-builders, re-negotiation of the planning permission and, 
most importantly, improvement in housing market conditions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Controversy   regarding   the   interaction   of   housing   supply,   economic   growth   and   ‘banked’, vacant, 
stalled, dormant or derelict sites has been a recurring feature of British urban policy.   Since the global 
financial crisis, the failure by developers to implement projects which have planning permission has 
been a source of frustration for central and local government.   At a national level, central government 
has viewed increased housing market and development activity as a key mechanism to stimulate the 
macro-economy.   In September 2012, the Mayor of London stated that there were 170,000 dwellings 
in stalled developments in the UK capital1.  He suggested that that these developments were stalled 
for a number of reasons; inability to access development and mortgage finance, overpayments for 
sites and unviable planning obligations were mentioned.    
 
 Drawing upon the research results of a government-sponsored research project, this paper provides an 
analysis of the nature and causes of stalled development projects.   It analyses a national database of 
stalled projects to identify broad patterns and, in addition, investigates a sample of case studies to 
identify the detailed factors that may result in lack of progress for schemes with planning permission. 
The paper therefore begins with a discussion of the, perhaps nebulous,  concept  of  a  ‘stalled’ site and 
discusses the range of factors that can result in the non-implementation of a planning permission.  
Drawing upon a national database and case studies, the third section sets out the method and data 
sources used to investigate the scope, types and causes of stalled sites in England.    This is followed 
by a discussion of the findings from the data analysis.  Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. Defining Stalled Sites 
 
In 2011 the  UK  Government  launched  the  ‘Get  Britain  Building’  programme  as  part  of   its Housing 
Strategy. The programme aims to unlock locally-backed stalled sites with planning permission to 
deliver up to 16,000 new homes.  Stalled sites are defined, albeit quasi-statutorily, as follows: 
 
“Stalled  sites  (which could be a standalone phase within a wider scheme) will be defined as 
those where there has been no construction activity on the relevant phase since 1 September 
2011 (excluding site clearance / remediation, affordable housing delivery construction where 
it has been possible to progress this in advance of other elements of the site and / or limited 
activity  to  implement  or  maintain  a  planning  permission)” 
 
Whilst the specific date is there for operational reasons, the key point is that a site is ‘shovel  ready’  
with planning permission (including a S106 agreement) in place.  In essence, a stalled site is defined 
broadly as a scheme with planning permission that is NOT being implemented.  However, if we view 
stalled sites through the framework of an event-event production system model, this definition seems 
                                                     
1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/davehillblog/2012/sep/20/boris-johnson-london-housing-crisis-andrew-boff 
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restrictive.  In the standard event sequence models of the development process, there are many events 
that typically precede the award of full planning permission (see Ball, 2010 for a description).  
Typically the process begins with the identification of the development opportunity, land assembly, 
feasibility analysis, regulatory approval etc.  Using a definition that defines a site as stalled after 
planning permission has been obtained means that, what is often perceived to be the most time-
consuming and difficult elements of the development process, can be omitted from an analysis of 
stalled sites (Healey, 1992).  The GBB approach narrowly defines development projects as stalled 
when the regulatory conditions for physical implementation have been fulfilled.  Yet it is clear from 
Healey’s  model of the development process that there are many planning-related events that precede 
physical implementation of a development project at which a development opportunity can become 
stalled (Healey, 1991).  The (by no means comprehensive) sequence of events outlined below 
illustrates the number of stages at which delay can occur. 
 
a) Site attains a latent development value. 
b) Site is identified as a potential development opportunity.  
c) Landowner/developer initiation of development. 
d) Potential schemes are conceived and their feasibility assessed. 
e) Pre-application discussions with and lobbying of local regulatory authorities and other 
stakeholders takes place, representations made to planning policy formation processes. 
f) Site is allocated for development in a Local Plan or via a Local Development Order. 
g) Negotiation of planning obligations occurs. 
h) Application for outline planning permission is made. 
i) Application for full planning permission is made. 
j) Full planning permission is granted. 
k) Construction of development commences. 
 
In terms of identifying stalled sites, one key issue is establishing how long these stages normally take.  
Following the GBB definition, it might be expected that a site should only be defined as stalled when 
an abnormal time period has lapsed since the penultimate event in the development process.  A study 
involving 509 housing schemes (consisting of 10 or more homes) completed in London during 2006 
provides a useful indicator of normal delay between planning permission and implementation (Craine, 
2012). Bearing in mind the buoyant development market conditions prevalent at this time, the study 
found that eight months was a typical period between grant of full planning consent and start of 
construction (DCLG, 2007, 35).  
 
One advantage of the Get Britain Building definition above is that it is fairly straightforward to 
classify sites as stalled.  However, the narrowness of this definition also needs to be interpreted in the 
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context of its purpose.  The definition of a stalled site guides researchers where, in the Popperian 
sense, to   ‘shine   the   torch’   in   terms   of   identifying   causation.      Clearly, when explaining why a 
development scheme is stalled, certain factors may have different levels of significance at different 
stages in the site ‘production system’.  Given the objectives of the government to stimulate housing 
supply in the short-term, the Get Britain Building scheme was essentially targeted at sites where 
construction could commence rapidly.  However, as pointed out above, it is also the case that sites 
may  be  ‘blocked’  much  further  back  in  the  'planning  pipeline'.    For  instance,  in  some  situations  there  
can a resolution to grant permission but, for whatever reason, the s106 agreement has not been agreed 
between the local planning authority and developer(s).  Even further  back  in  the  ‘pipeline’,  failure  to  
agree on key issues at pre-application negotiations may mean that sites are stalled because the local 
planning authority and the applicant cannot reach agreement on key issues.  Effectively, the result 
may   be   that   the   site   is   ‘stalled’   because   of   planning   obligations   at   an   earlier   stage   in   the   planning  
system.  Whilst it seems reasonable to infer that sites stalled at an earlier stage in the planning process 
are more likely to be stalled for planning reasons, it is also the case that a proportion of such sites are 
likely to have a long development history  in  which  this  may  simply  be  the  ‘latest  instalment’.   
 
A specific situation seems to be indicated in the Get Building Britain definition of stalled sites.  It is 
that the developer has obtained planning permission, signed a s106 agreement, etc. but is currently 
unable to implement the permission because the development is not (sufficiently) profitable with its 
current permission.  The implication is that a downturn in market conditions has made a once viable 
development now financially unviable.  Recent Government policy has sought to address this 
‘viability  problem’  by  introducing  a  series  of  measures  that  might  render  the  development  viable  once  
again.  These include: 
 
 A direct financial subsidy 
 A re-negotiation of the s106 agreement 
 A re-negotiation of other terms of the planning application 
 
However, there may be other explanations for non-implementation of permission to develop unrelated 
to the terms of the planning permission, associated planning obligations or, indeed, market conditions.  
Drane (2013) pointed out that sites that appear static to the naked eye may, in in fact, be the locus of 
substantial development-related activity such as re-zoning and transfers of ownership.  Strategic 
behaviour by developers is also possible.  There are anecdotes of landowners agreeing s106 
agreements without intending to commence development or to sell land in order to secure the 
principle of development on the site or to avoid higher levels of planning obligations.  This is 
sometimes termed in the development industry  as  ‘banking  a  permission’: the implication being that 
the  planning  permission   is   ‘deposited’  until   it  needs   to  be   ‘drawn  down’  at  a   later  date.     Similarly, 
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although there may be further issues to be addressed before construction can commence, a developer 
or landowner may need to secure planning permission in order to meet the terms of funding or option 
agreements.   
 
Another potential factor is that a proportion of stalled sites have become part of the asset base or  ‘land  
bank’  of house-building companies.  Land banks serve a dual purpose: to provide a resource for the 
construction of new real estate and to provide a portfolio of assets for land investment.   There is a 
longstanding literature on the issue of land-banking by major house building companies (see White, 
1986).   As early as 1974, it was pointed out in the Investors Chronicle that  “[d]espite appearances, 
house-building is only partially the business of putting up houses.  The houses are the socially 
acceptable   side   of   making   profits   out   of   land   appreciation”.  More recently, focussing on their 
business models, whilst the Callcutt Review (2007) identified the land inventory needs of the house-
builders to ensure a supply of developable land, it also noted significant variation in the extent of 
landholdings.  With an average holding of 2.8 years supply of land, one major house-builder held over 
six years’ supply (Callcutt Review, 2007).  For some house-building companies there may be a 
conflict between their different roles as land investment companies and house-building companies.  
However, it is important not to overplay the relative significance of this factor.  Data (provided by 
Savills) in the Callcutt Review relating to the proportion of land with planning permission owned by 
house-builders suggested that they owned a relatively small proportion - less than 10%.  Clearly, 
before physical construction can commence, much of the land will still need to be transferred to 
housing developers.     
 
A change in the level of risk averseness may mean that certain types of project are more liable to 
become stalled than others.  Due to their higher risk, sites where it is difficult to develop in phases are 
more likely to be stalled.  In a report for the Office of Fair Trading in 2008, KPMG highlighted such 
problems   with   apartment   developments   with   the   developer   exposed   to   “capital   lock-up linked to 
inability  to  phase  sales…  and  greater  exposure  to  uncertainties  in  demand”  (KPMG,  2008,  8).  At the 
nadir of the economic downturn, in a report for the Homes & Communities Agency, DTZ (2009) 
concluded that all high density urban development involving development comprising almost entirely 
of flats was not viable anywhere in the country.  In contrast, low density, multi-building schemes are 
fairly straightforward to phase; the developer retains real options to stop and/or change the 
development as it is progressing.  Such schemes can begin to finance themselves and, therefore, risks 
from sharp changes in market conditions are much lower.  In contrast, for single building, high 
density schemes, the developer can lose numerous options to re-negotiate the terms of the planning 
permission and to change the pace of development with the result that the development risks are 
significantly increased.  In a risk-averse market environment, projects with high suspension costs may 
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be more prone to stalling due to market conditions that have produced a substantial increase in the 
developer’s  risk  premium  rather than to prices or planning obligations.   
 
Whilst there has been little academic literature focussed specifically on stalled sites, there is an 
established body of work on vacant sites.   Motivated by policy concerns about inner city decline, 
there have been a number of papers by David Adams with collaborators, investigating the effect of 
ownership constraints on the operation of urban land markets (see Adams, Baum and McGregor, 1988 
and Adams, Disberry, Hutchinson and Munjoma, 2001).  This work has suggested that ownership 
problems and behaviour can undermine the standard neo-classical assumptions that land supply 
responds to market signals to produce development at the right time, in the right place and at the right 
price.  It found that urban sites may not be brought forward for development because of a combination 
of passive ownership (encouraged by low holding costs), fragmented ownership rights and speculative 
behaviour.  Prior to the global financial crisis, in order to promote land supply in what was an 
increasingly buoyant housing market in the UK, Barker (2004) proposed amendments to the property 
taxation system to encourage the more rapid re-use of urban sites.   
 
In addition, following Titman (1985), there is a body of US literature more formally analysing the 
behaviour of vacant site owners from a real options perspective.  Essentially,   owners’  decisions  on  
whether to sell a site to a developer are analysed in terms of weighing the opportunity costs associated 
with keeping the site vacant against the expected gain from delaying sale until more favourable 
market conditions prevail.  This body of work suggests that the value of the call option to wait (i.e. 
hold back land from development) increases in more volatile or uncertain market conditions and so 
may explain, at least in part, why sites appear increasingly stalled at present.  More recent work on the 
optimal phasing and inventory issues in real estate development also suggests that, for owners of large 
and/or multiple sites, it can be economically rational to phase the release of land incrementally over 
time (Hughen, Ott and Read, 2012).  This type of strategic behaviour by landowners has clear links to 
the  controversy  concerning  ‘land  hoarding’ by house-building companies discussed above. 
 
Although it is specific to the current English planning policy environment, a further factor that may be 
explain the lack of progress on some sites is the option offered to landowners by local planning 
authorities, to revisit and renegotiate planning agreements.  In order to kick start stalled development 
sites, government guidance has been issued on  the  review  of  schemes  that  have  stalled  for  ‘financial  
viability’   reasons   (HCA,   2012).     The guidance suggests   that   local   planning   authorities   ‘review   the  
degree  of  flexibility’  around  delivery  of  planning  components,  namely  land  use,  design,  master  plan, 
infrastructure and housing provision and carbon reduction.  Essentially it encourages local authorities 
to look again at the planning requirements of these stalled schemes.  The Government has also, via the 
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Growth and Infrastructure Act, inserted new sections into the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act 
which introduce review and appeal procedures in relation to affordable housing requirements that 
have already been settled in extant s106 agreements (DCLG, 2012).  These measures, when coupled 
with a general encouragement to voluntarily re-visit previously agreed planning obligations, open up 
the prospect of open-ended renegotiation of not only planning obligations but other previously agreed 
planning requirements too and this can, of itself, stall developments.   
 
In summary, it is clear that the sharp economic downturn has affected the financial viability of many 
development projects that have managed to navigate the planning system.  However, despite the 
current political salience, surprisingly little systematic research has been carried out on the type, 
location and number of stalled sites. If the policy objective to increase housing supply is to be 
achieved, there is a limited evidence base on which to construct related policy.   
 
3. Data and Method 
 
The research utilises two sources of information relating to sites with planning permission that are 
perceived to be stalled: a national database of construction projects supplied by Glenigan and a case 
study analysis of specific stalled sites. This mixed methods approach was conceived as a way to build 
both a broader picture of the prevalence of stalled sites (at the national scale) and to provide an 
opportunity  to  ‘drill-down’  to  explore  the  specific  factors stalling schemes at the individual site level. 
As Fellows and Liu (2008: 28) note, combining qualitative and qualitative approaches in this way can 
provide a “multi-dimensional view of the subject,  gained  through  synergy”. 
 
National database 
 
Information   on   schemes   that   are   in   the   ‘development   pipeline’   is   collected   and   maintained   by  
Glenigan, a private sector provider of construction and property development-related data including 
planning applications, permissions, construction tenders, contracts and completions.  For the purposes 
of this project, Glenigan supplied a snapshot of data that described the nature, scale and location of 
‘stalled’   development   schemes   in England as at July 17, 2012.  It comprises 1,411 sites totalling 
75,534 units and, according to Glenigan, constitutes an estimated £8,959m of Gross Development 
Value as at July 2012.  Of the 1,411 sites, the majority (1,217) involve new developments.  Of the 
remainder, 46 are extensions (to existing buildings) and 148 are refurbishments.  The dates of the 
planning applications relevant to the schemes range from August 2000 to the March 2012.  All are 
classified  as  ‘large’  by  Glenigan;;  meaning  that  they  relate  to  developments  other  than  changes  of  use  
and minor works such as extensions.  Permission dates range from 06/07/01 to 29/05/12 (four records 
did not have permission dates). 
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Case Studies 
 
The purpose of the case studies was to focus on specific stalled projects in order to examine in more 
depth the rationales and situations of site owners.  In order to ensure projects from each region and 
representing different types of development were captured, it was decided that targeting a total of 
approximately 20 case studies would provide an adequate sample to obtain evidence of the factors that 
can stall development. Although this is a small number relative to the total number of stalled 
development sites across England, it nonetheless encompasses a broad range of sites in terms of 
location and size.  This diversity was also reflected in the composition of the schemes.  For example, a 
number were large, urban extensions incorporating community and commercial facilities as well as 
large residential elements.  At the other end of the scale, there were a number of sites with planning 
permission for a few dozen dwellings.   
 
Similarly, a diverse range of planning obligations had been agreed. It is important to point out here 
that the aim of the research was to provide an in-depth evaluation of each site rather than to generate a 
sample that could be used to make inferences regarding significant differences between different 
categories of site.  Thus, whilst an attempt was made to cover a range of value areas and size of 
schemes, it is not possible to make any inferences about differences in the role of planning obligations 
between the categories of site.  Put simply, the case studies will not provide answers to questions such 
as   “Are   planning   obligations   having   different   types  of   impact   in   large/low  value/mixed   use   sites?”  
This, in our view, does not devalue the usefulness of the data provided by a selected range of case 
studies. Indeed individual and unusual or unique cases may reveal much about general processes, 
whether  they  are  ‘scaled-up’  or  not  (see  Sayer,  1992,  Ettlinger,  2009).  However,  we  do  acknowledge 
that care must be taken not to over-generalise when abstracting results from case studies (Flyvbjerg, 
2001, Yin, 2008).  The sample of stalled sites was purposively generated from a combination of sites 
suggested by local planning authorities, developers, a project advisory group and the personal 
knowledge of the research team.  The composition of the sample was therefore not based on random 
sampling but rather reflected the willingness of individuals to put forward examples to the research 
team. 
 
We divided the country into three broad value areas: 
 ‘High’  – London and South East  
 ‘Medium’  – South West and East of England  
 ‘Low’  – East and West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside  and North East and North 
West 
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As each case study was submitted, we reviewed whether it was within a local authority which was of 
a much higher/lower value than the majority of local authorities in the value band.  If this was the 
case, drawing upon DCLG data on local authority house prices, we allocated the case study to a more 
appropriate value band.  Schemes were defined as being either large (100 dwellings or more) or small 
(less than 100 dwellings).  Table 1 summarises the sample of proposed case studies.  It shows the total 
number of dwellings in case study schemes for each house price band, in three types of location – 
urban, suburban and urban extensions (typically a large scale greenfield development on the edge of 
an existing settlement).  For each value band and location type (e.g. urban in the high house price 
band), the table sets out the total case study schemes in the sample. 
 
Table 1:  Potential proposed case studies by location and value area (number of dwellings in italics) 
 Urban Suburban Urban  
extension 
Total 
schemes 
Total 
dwellings 
High house price 3,600 1,600 10,500 43 15,700 
Large 9 2 4 15  
Small 18 (in 6 
LAs) 
10 (in 3 
LAs) 
 28  
Medium house price 3,500 2,400 15,000 36 20,900 
Large  7 1 9 17  
Small 8 11 (in 5 
LAs) 
 19  
Low house price 3,900 700 13,500 59 18,100 
Large 12 2 7 21  
Small 26 12  38  
      
Total schemes  80 38 20 138  
Total number of 
dwellings 
11,000 4,700 39,000  54,700 
 
The initial ‘convenient’  sample of stalled sites set out in table 1 shows a number of characteristics.  
43% of all stalled sites suggested by local planning authorities etc. are in low house price regions 
compared with 31% in high price regions and 26% in medium price regions.  However, the incidence 
of dwellings in stalled sites is slightly different with fewer dwellings (33%) in the low price areas and 
more dwellings (38%) in the medium price area.  Urban extensions account for 15% of all sites but 
71% of all dwellings and ranged in size from under 1,000 units to more than 4,000 units.  28% of all 
dwellings in stalled sites are located in suburban areas with 58% in urban areas. Very few examples of 
stalled sites in London were identified.   There were 11 non-residential stalled schemes: six of these 
were in high price areas, four in medium value areas and only one in low value areas. 
 
From this initial sample of 138 suggested case studies, we obtained agreement for a detailed 
assessment from developers and local authority planners at 18 sites.  Having gathered data on the 
permitted schemes, the assessment also involved semi-structured interviews with representatives from 
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developers/landowners and the local authority planning officer. The sites represent a spread of 
location types (urban, suburban, greenfield/urban extension) within each of the three value bands 
(low, medium, high) – broadly representative of their proportions in the sample of 138 schemes.    
 
7 – high value areas 
4 – medium value areas 
7 – low value areas 
 
Given commercial and negotiating sensitivities, we reassured the appropriate parties that no individual 
site or scheme would be identifiable in the research results. The interviews were mainly conducted by 
telephone during October and November 2012.  Since a number of the interviewees expressed a 
preference for a telephone interviews, the vast majority of interviews were conducted by telephone 
rather than face-to-face.  There did not seem to be any substantive difference in tone and content 
between the two approaches to the interviews.  Two researchers were present at most of the 
interviews.  Both interviewers took notes of the responses.  Consistent with the semi-structured 
approach, the interviews were both informal and exploratory or open-ended in nature.   
 
4. Results 
 
Number, location and types of stalled sites  
 
In terms of a national picture, Table 2 categorises the stalled developments according to their 
predominant land use (as assigned by Glenigan).  Residential-led schemes account for 94% of all 
stalled projects and comprise nearly 72,000 dwellings, representing approximately three quarters of 
one  year’s  supply the sites.  These residential schemes are the focus of subsequent analysis.  Table 2 
shows that nearly two thirds of stalled residential schemes are apartment-led developments with 
houses and bungalows accounting for a third and specialist housing (student accommodation and 
sheltered housing) accounting for around 4%.  This can be compared to dwelling completions in the 
2012/13 which were 24% flats and 76% houses2. 
  
                                                     
2 DCLG Live Table 254, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/199190/LiveTable254.xls  
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Table 2: Sites in England with planning permission but no construction activity, July 2012 
Predominant use Number 
of sites 
Number of 
dwellings 
Average 
number of 
dwellings 
per site 
Residential: 
Apartments, flats 735 44,972 63% 61 
Houses, bungalows, chalets, luxury housing 499 23,771 33% 48 
Sheltered housing, elderly persons homes, nursing 
homes 
57 1,399 2% 25 
Student accommodation 40 1,679 2% 42 
TOTAL 1,331 71,821 100%  
Commercial, industrial and other:  
Shopping centres, shops, supermarkets 13 1,011 
Shipping terminals, ports 1 774 
Offices 8 736 
Residential outlines 2 364 
Hotels / motels 7 283 
Warehousing, storage, workshops, light industrial 6 213 
Homes and hostels  6 96 
Misc 37 190 
TOTAL 80 3,667 
Source: Glenigan data set  
 
Ignoring the permission granted for one site on 07/12/01, the residential-led stalled developments 
received planning permissions between 29/02/04 and 29/05/12. Figure 1 shows the numbers of 
currently stalled schemes categorised by the date of planning permission.  Not unexpectedly, a small 
proportion of stalled sites (in July 2012) were granted planning permission before the global financial 
crisis.  In 2008-9, there was a significant increase in the numbers of sites stalled that were granted 
permission in these years.  This shift has continued for 2010 and 2011.  However, given that the 
planning permissions are relatively recent, a proportion of the non-implemented planning permissions 
may  be  due  to  ‘normal’  delays  in  construction  procurement, execution of sales to house-builders etc. 
rather than any fundamental problems with the schemes.  It is also possible that a proportion of 
planning permissions granted in 2010 and 2011 were renewals or changes to existing schemes. 
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Figure 1: Number of unimplemented planning permissions in England, as of July 2012 
(categorised by year planning permission was granted) 
 
Stalled sites that were granted planning permission between October 2010 and September 2011 are 
classified by region in Table 3 and compared to the number of major permissions granted in the same 
year.  As a proportion of all major decisions, the region with the largest percentage of stalled sites is 
the North East (17%), the region with the lowest median house price.  It is notable that the proportions 
for all other regions are fairly consistent, ranging between 5% and 8%.  Broadly, we do not find 
significant regional differences in the propensity for sites to stall. 
 
Table 3: Stalled sites as a proportion of major residential planning permissions, by region (2010/11) 
Region Number of 
stalled sites 
Major 
residential 
decisions 
(year-end Sept 
‘11) 
Number of 
stalled sites as a 
percentage of 
major 
residential 
decisions 
Unknown 5 - - 
East Midlands 33 418 8% 
East of England 33 482 7% 
London 40 435 8% 
North East 15 191 17% 
North West 52 533 6% 
South East 51 662 5% 
South West 43 455 7% 
West Midlands 41 395 8% 
Yorkshire and The Humber 58 481 7% 
Grand Total 371 4,052  
Source: DCLG (Live Table P136) and Glenigan database 
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The residential sites were linked to the UK Postcode Directory using the postcode as the common 
identifier.  Not all sites had a valid postcode (there were 128 mismatches).  Table 4 shows that most of 
the stalled sites are located within urban settlements with a population of 10,000 or more and in a less 
sparsely populated hinterland.  This rather vague definition comes from the UK Postcode Directory 
and is based on an Ordnance Survey classification but it illustrates that the majority are located on 
brownfield sites.  Because brownfield sites typically have a higher existing use value than greenfield 
sites and are more likely to be apartment schemes, they tend to be more marginal in terms of financial 
viability.  It is therefore not surprising that most of the stalled sites are brownfield. 
 
Table 4: Stalled sites by settlement type 
Geographical location Units Sites 
Urban settlements with a population of 10,000 or more and the wider 
surrounding area is sparsely populated 
50 0% 4 0% 
Small town and fringe areas category and the wider surrounding area is 
sparsely populated  
93 0% 7 1% 
Village and the wider surrounding area is sparsely populated 199 0% 11 1% 
Hamlet or isolated dwelling and the wider surrounding area is sparsely 
populated  
86 0% 5 0% 
Urban settlements with a population of 10,000 or more and the wider 
surrounding area is less sparsely populated 
51,519 72% 969 73% 
Small town and fringe areas and the wider surrounding area is less sparsely 
populated 
2433 3% 91 7% 
Village and the wider surrounding area is less sparsely populated 2,450 3% 68 5% 
Hamlet or isolated dwelling and the wider surrounding area is less sparsely 
populated  
1,076 1% 38 3% 
Scotland/NI/Channel Is/IoM 919 1% 10 1% 
No information available 13,040 18% 128 10% 
Grand Total 71,865  1,331  
Source: Glenigan 
 
It is expected that the level of house prices will also affect the propensity of development projects to 
stall.  Dividing the 2010 median house price for each of the 326 unitary authorities into quintiles and 
summing the number of stalled units in each reveals a negative correlation between average house 
price and number of stalled units. 
 
Table 5: Median house prices and stalled sites in England 
Quintile 2010 median 
house price (£) 
Number 
of local 
authorities 
Number of stalled 
dwellings, July 
2012 
Percentage 
of total 
1 73,000 – 132,000 65 24,536 35 
2 132,000 – 160,000 65 14,248 20 
3 160,000 – 195,000 65 11,038 16 
4 195,000 – 245,000 65 11,544 16 
5 245,000 – 750,000 66 9,212 13 
Total  326 70,578 100% 
      Source: DCLG (Live Table 582) and Glenigan 
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Table 6 categorises the local authorities in England by the price per  hectare  of   ‘bulk’  housing   land  
(land parcels in excess of two hectares) as estimated by the Valuation Office Agency (2010 values). 
Against this appears the number of stalled dwellings in each category.  Although it was not possible to 
match all stalled site locations to local authorities (the mismatch rate was approximately 9%), it is 
clear that the majority of stalled residential development sites are located in the low land value areas.  
Figure 2 shows the location of the Glenigan stalled sites.  The size of the circles is proportionate to the 
number of units proposed at each site.  Underneath the circles is a choropleth map showing the price 
per   hectare   of   ‘bulk’   housing   land   (land   parcels   in   excess   of   two   hectares)   as   estimated   by   the  
Valuation Office Agency (2010 values).  The map overlay reveals the prevalence of stalled residential 
development sites in the north of England. 
 
Table 6: Housing land values and stalled sites in England 
Quintile 2010  ‘bulk’  housing land 
values (£) 
Number of stalled 
dwellings, July 
2012 
Percentage 
of total 
1 550,000 – 1,550,000 37,628 59% 
2 1,550,001 – 2,750,000 11,860 18% 
3 2,750,001 – 4,450,000 3,095 5% 
4 4,450,001 – 7,560,000 8,125 13% 
5 7,560,001 – 15,375,000 3,486 5% 
Total  64,244 100% 
      Source: DCLG (Live Table 582) and Glenigan 
 
Therefore, aside from the North East no major regional variation was found in the propensity of sites 
to be stalled. However, and perhaps not surprisingly, Tables 5 and 6 suggest that a key issue is local 
house prices and land values. 
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Figure 2: Location of stalled sites in relation to the value of housing land 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Glenagin data? 
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Table 7 shows that, for residential development projects of ten or more dwellings that were approved 
in the ten-year period from January 2003 to December 2013, approximately two thirds of those which 
started within six months were housing rather than flats.  This proportion drops as the period between 
approval and start of construction lengthens to the point where 44% of schemes started after a two-
year delay are flats. 
Table 7: Starts by Dwelling Types 2003-2013  
Period between 
approval and start 
Scheme 
type 
Number 
of units 
Number 
of 
schemes 
Less than 6 months Flats 238,584 4,127 
Houses 453,221 7,265 
6 - 12 months Flats 67,610 1,149 
Houses 98,482 1,597 
12 - 24 months Flats 50,718 715 
Houses 53,897 837 
More than 24 months Flats 30,374 403 
Houses 40,062 519 
(Source: Glenigan) 
Construction began on schemes totalling 100,000 units per annum on average over the ten-year period 
(note that this figure excludes schemes of less than ten units).  Concentrating on schemes that have 
stalled, Figure 3 illustrates, in the first two sets of columns, the number of flat and housing schemes 
that were put on hold at some point during the ten-year time period.  The second two columns show 
the number of schemes on hold at the end of the period and the last two columns show the number of 
schemes that were either cancelled before construction started or abandoned at some point after 
construction had begun.  The prevalence of flat schemes is clear to see, as is the small to medium 
sized schemes of 11 to 50 units.  It should be noted, however, that large residential schemes such as 
urban extensions may involve several planning applications and construction tendering processes.  
Consequently,   the   gradual   ‘building   out’   of   these   large   developments   may   appear   as   a   series   of  
smaller schemes in the Glenigan database. 
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Figure 3: Stalled, abandoned and cancelled residential development, 2003-2012 (Source: Glenigan) 
 
 
Case study results 
 
Turning to look at the more site-specific scale, the 18 case studies can be broadly categorised as 
follows (the definitions have been devised for this study): 
 
 Large-scale strategic greenfield development (1,000 or more dwellings) 4 
 Significant greenfield scheme with 100 or more dwellings  4 
 Small greenfield scheme (99 or fewer dwellings)   2 
 Large urban redevelopment/regeneration site (100+ dwellings)  3 
 Small urban redevelopment/ regeneration site (99 or fewer dwellings) 4 
 Urban infill – ‘clean  site’      1 
 
The greenfield schemes are similar in character, typically taking the form of urban extensions - 
housing developments adjoining existing settlements.  Depending on their scale, they include different 
types and levels of transport provision, community and other facilities as well as dedicated open 
space.  The previously developed sites, on the other hand, are more diverse.  They include heavily 
contaminated and difficult-to-develop former factory sites in dense urban (city centre) locations. 
There are also examples of small (e.g. for 50 dwellings) redevelopment schemes where demolition of 
an existing building (e.g. a former pub or hotel) is part of the planning permission and urban infill 
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schemes where little is required to bring the site forward for development and development conditions 
are benign. 
 
Scale and Nature of Planning Obligations 
 
Across the case studies, a diverse range of planning obligations3 had been agreed. Housing 
developments above a certain size must include a proportion of affordable dwellings (social, shared 
equity or affordable rented housing).  Only one scheme above the local site size threshold had agreed 
no provision for affordable housing, and this was on viability grounds. Where affordable housing was 
sought, the amount varied, although not as much as expected given the range of market values and 
development conditions found in the case studies. 
 
While sample sizes were too small to draw any statistical inferences, the expected pattern of higher 
levels of affordable housing in higher value areas was found.  In the high and medium value areas, 
seven out of ten s106 agreements required between 20% to 30% of the total number of units to be 
affordable with three over 30%, and the highest being 40%.  In the low value area, 20% to 25% was 
the most common proportion although there was one scheme at 0% and one with a requirement for 
more than 30%.  Planning obligations other than affordable housing were scheme-specific, depending 
on measures required to mitigate the impact of the development; the larger the scheme, the more 
diverse the requirements.  These included the expected types of planning obligations; highways 
works, public transport and education contributions, community facilities, public art, play areas and 
recreation facilities, etc. 
 
As well as variety in the make-up of the contributions required, the case studies varied in the amount 
of contribution per dwelling, as the following analysis illustrates: 
 
 Small scheme/high value area -  £3,700 per dwelling (no affordable housing – below 
threshold) 
 Large scheme/medium value area  – £13,000 per dwelling  + 30% affordable housing  
 Large scheme/high value area -  £2,800 per dwelling + 35% affordable housing 
 Small scheme/low value area –  £3,000 dwelling + 25% affordable housing 
 Large scheme/low value area -  £1,800 per dwelling + 0% affordable housing 
 
 
                                                     
3 These are agreed under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act and are therefore usually referred 
to as s106 agreements. 
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Scheme Histories 
 
Although  each  site  had  its  own  particular  ‘journey’  through  the  development  and  planning  processes,  
there are some similarities in the time and effort required to achieve a planning permission. There 
were several examples of schemes that had taken over ten years from an initial allocation in a 
development plan to planning permission and at least one example of a scheme that has taken more 
than 20 years.  It is perhaps worth briefly expanding on the latter as an illustration (perhaps extreme) 
of the ways in which planned development can be delayed.  The site – an urban extension in a high 
value area – is under single ownership used as farmland.  It was allocated for housing in a local plan 
in the mid 1980s as part of a major development area.  Legal and site issues relating to utilities and 
road infrastructure development meant that the first planning application was not submitted until the 
late 1990s.  Further disputes regarding emerging environmental regulation meant that this application 
lapsed and a second was submitted some eight years later.  Then, in 2011, a new Local Plan was 
published which required a 25 per cent affordable housing allocation which was subsequently raised 
to 40 per cent.  S106 heads of terms were agreed and a resolution to grant was made subject to 
detailed discussions regarding the S106 agreement, but then a legal issue arose regarding adjacent 
land.  Following the market downturn, the local authority and landowner are currently renegotiating 
aspects of the s106 agreement.  Construction has not yet started. 
 
It  is  not  possible  to  provide  a  simple  analysis  of  the  dates  when  the  case  studies  were  first  ‘promoted’  
for development since some schemes were allocated in a development plan and others were  ‘windfall  
sites’; the first time the latter are identified to the planning authority is as a planning application.  
There can also be complications where the extant planning permission is not the first permission 
granted on the site.  Nevertheless, Table 8 groups the case studies according to the length of time 
between first securing planning permission and the case study interviews (2012).   
 
Table 8: Length of time since (outline) planning permission was granted4 
Number of years Number of case studies 
Less than 2 3 
3 to 5 8 
6 or more 3 
Not yet permitted5 3 
 
The majority of the case studies had been granted planning permission within the last five years but 
three had older planning permissions.  It is important to bear in mind that some planning permissions 
                                                     
4 One case study was composed of a series of small schemes, each with variable planning histories. 
5 In all these cases, there was a resolution to grant permission but the s106 agreement was still being negotiated. 
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that were granted relatively recently may in fact relate to an application first submitted several years 
earlier.  
 
Reasons for stalled schemes 
 
One of the objectives of this research was to investigate the extent to which the level of planning 
obligations is stalling development.  This requires a focus on particular sites where the developer has 
obtained planning permission, signed an s106 agreement but is currently failing to implement the 
permission. The implication is that a change in market conditions has rendered a once viable 
development now financially unviable.  Identifying causation in this type of exercise can be difficult 
and overall the interviews revealed a complex picture. It was notable that for the 18 case studies, 41 
reasons for non-implementation of the planning permission were recorded.  This indicates that 
multiple factors were affecting individual sites.  Even isolating as opposed to measuring the 
contribution of a factor to an observed outcome can be problematic. The results of the interview 
survey  reveal  the   types  of  complications  that  can  emerge.   In  order  for  a  site  to  be  ‘shovel-ready’,  a  
number of changes may need to occur. In terms of project implementation, the market may need to 
improve through increases in prices and turnover.  Project implementation may require a re-
negotiation of the planning permission in order to change the scale and mix of the development and 
also, in some cases, to reduce the level of planning obligations.  In addition, there may be issues 
relating to the site or with landowners that need to be resolved before a planning permission can be 
implemented.  The interviews reveal examples of all these types of issues and their consequent impact 
on the negotiation of planning obligations.   
 
An analysis of the case studies shows that changed market conditions are the key reason for sites 
becoming stalled.  However, it is not the only reason and there is usually a combination of factors 
determining whether a site is stalled or progressing.  Table 9 sets out the main reasons put forward for 
delays in bringing schemes forward (note that there could be more than one reason for each case 
study).   
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Table 9: Reasons for Case Study Schemes Becoming Stalled 
Reason No. 
Market conditions 
Market values have fallen/sales rates generally down 
Development finance difficult to secure 
Low sales rates/ market change means that need a different mix of dwellings (e.g. replace 
apartments with houses) 
 
10 
1 
 
3 
General viability issues 
Generally a difficult scheme to make work (e.g. high abnormal costs/low values) 
‘Overpaid’  for  the  site 
 
4 
2 
Ownership issues  
Change of owners (and could lead to a completely new scheme) 
Third parties with control over part of site/ consortium of developers and/or landowners 
failing to agree/ change in personal circumstances of landowner 
 
2 
 
3 
Developer not actively pursuing development 
Waiting for upturn in market, have a better scheme nearby 
Sought policy compliant permission but anticipated would not be viable 
 
6 
2 
Other issues 
Third party actions e.g. unforeseen intervention by a utility 
 
1 
Complex scheme with long lead in times (usually, but not exclusively, large scale schemes) 4 
 
The analysis confirms that changing market conditions is the primary reason for schemes becoming 
stalled in the period since 2008/09. Market values have fallen (‘house  prices  have  dropped   through  
the  floor’ was a typical comment from interviewees) and, in line with price drops in some areas, price 
reductions of circa 15% were quoted by developers.  But rates of sales have also fallen, for example, 
one interviewee indicated that current sale rates were about 50% of predicted rates pre-downturn.  
This can turn a previously implementable s106 agreement into something that cannot be delivered, as 
the following quote from a developer of a larger greenfield site illustrates, ‘the agreement was fair 
and policy compliant but it was assessed in a rising housing market…’.  When the 
developer/landowner is faced with the changed market circumstances, they have to decide whether to 
proceed or to, as one interviewee put it, he was ‘waiting for the market to improve’.     This   can   be  
equally true for the developer (unwilling to risk the expenditure on getting a scheme started) and the 
landowner (not willing to reduce the price they expect to receive for their land).   
 
However, it was also acknowledged that it was not possible to separate the causal factors neatly and 
that, in a falling market with reduced sales volumes, a reduced level of planning obligations 
(especially affordable housing) could improve viability sufficiently to get a scheme underway. Putting 
aside the problem of high levels upfront infrastructure costs often required to progress large-scale 
developments, another factor leading to some sites stalling relates to land ownership.  This can 
involve a third party with control over a vital piece of land and/or issues to be resolved within a 
developer and/or landowner consortium.  For instance, in two of the case studies, although planning 
permission had been granted, the sites were occupied and trading as businesses (one was a hotel and 
the other a car showroom) so they could not realistically be  construed  as  ‘shovel  ready’.  On one of 
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the larger sites, the developer decided that it would be preferable to agree planning obligations and 
outline consent as soon as possible due to imminent changes in the policy regarding planning 
obligations.  Without any intention to implement the agreed planning consent, the developer did not 
want to delay obtaining the principle of consent on the site and risk potentially more onerous 
obligations being imposed by planning officers at a later date.  In addition, there were four 
landowners involved in the scheme and it was difficult to get them all to agree to market the site when 
land prices were falling.  On another large scheme, land ownership issues were still being resolved 
and the developer did not control all land.  Compulsory purchase procedures and negotiations with 
other landowners were underway.  It was also clear in some of the case studies that the existing 
consent would not be implemented and would have to be re-negotiated. 
 
Overall, it was clear that the shift in market conditions had created a range of reactions amongst 
landowners (usually not house-builders) with the result that consents were unlikely to result in 
construction activity in the short-term.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Albeit at a different scale, the problem of stalled sites is akin to urban regeneration interventions that 
aim to overcome risk aversion and economic viability problems associated with (re)development in 
weak economic conditions.  With a national rather than a local focus, addressing the housing supply 
crisis is viewed by the government as part of a wider strategy aimed at ‘regenerating’   the macro-
economy.  A range of stimulus measures has been used, and continues to be introduced, to encourage 
and enable the house-building sector to increase output.  Implicit in the attempts to subsidise stalled 
projects is the presumption that projects are stalled because they are not financially viable.  Hence, 
through programmes such as Get Britain Building, the Growing Places Fund and the Local 
Infrastructure Fund among others, public funds are offered to developers to pay for infrastructure 
costs, to improve viability. In addition, local planning authorities are pressed to re-negotiate and 
reduce levels of planning obligations.   
 
While there is a growing raft of policy interventions, policy formation seems to be taking place in an 
evidential vacuum; essentially the type, nature and causes of stalled projects seem to be poorly 
understood. At the macro-level, the empirical evidence on the location and type of stalled projects 
suggests that financial viability is likely to be the primary driver.  Stalled projects are more likely to 
be found in low house value areas and/or higher risk projects and/or projects in sectors that have 
experienced the largest house price falls.  The high proportion of stalled projects in apartment 
developments is a clear finding in this context.  Indeed, claims that use broad-brush figures about the 
number of units with planning permission do not take into account the fact that a large proportion of 
24 
 
schemes are unlikely to be viable. The overarching shifts are that house values have fallen in many 
areas, developers’   and   lenders’   risk aversion has increased and, as a result, once viable financially 
feasible projects are no longer feasible.  At current market prices and taking into account development 
costs, housing development is not viable on a substantial proportion of what is often defined as 
housing land supply.     
 
Furthermore, the case study research suggests that the reasons for many stalled projects may be more 
nuanced than simply viability.  For operational reasons, house-builders need to maintain an inventory 
of sites in order to manage their workflow.  However, some house-building companies may be 
operating as land investment vehicles as well as house-building businesses.  Nevertheless, problems 
with stalled projects cannot be wholly attributed to house-builder behaviour.  Previous research has 
suggested that house-builders own a small proportion of stalled sites with planning permission and a 
number of our case study sites were not owned by house-building companies.  Other landowners seem 
to be exercising their options to delay the sale of their sites.  Although a site may appear inactive, it is 
clear that the lack of physical development may be due to ownership conflicts, problems of land title, 
land transfers, etc.  In addition, we find evidence of landowners   ‘banking’   permissions   in   order   to  
protect themselves from changes in policy.  For this type of scheme, planning permissions need to be 
re-negotiated before development can commence.   
 
Whilst obtaining planning permission may be a necessary condition for development to take place, it 
is often not a sufficient condition and it is unlikely that a significant proportion of stalled sites, even if 
financially  viable,  could  be  considered  ‘shovel-ready’.  A better understanding of the typical events 
that occur after a site has obtained planning permission is needed before we can understand the key 
barriers to the implementation of a planning permission.  Although policy is concentrating on viability 
as a root cause of stalled sites, the reality is not so straightforward; a range of factors can cause a site 
to be stalled and causality must be understood for policy interventions to be effective.  
Macroeconomic conditions in the capital and labour markets; housing demand and supply at national, 
regional and local levels; the poorly-understood trade-off between house-building and land 
speculation; and site-specific factors such as land assembly, sunk costs, infrastructure requirements 
etc., all require further investigation.    
  
25 
 
References 
 
Adams, D., Baum, A. and MacGregor, B. (1988) The Availability of Land for Inner City 
Development: A Case Study of Inner Manchester, Urban Studies, 25, 62-76. 
Adams, D., Disberry, A., Hutchison, N. and Munjoma, T. (2001) Ownership constraints to brownfield 
re-development, Environment and Planning A, 33, 453–477. 
Ball, M. (2010) The House Building Industry: Promoting Recovery in Housing Supply, A Report for 
the Department of Communities and Local Government, April, 2010. 
Barker, K. (2004) Review of housing supply: securing our future housing needs, Interim Report – 
Analysis, HM Treasury, London. 
Craine, T. (2012) Barriers to housing delivery: what are the market-perceived barriers to residential 
development in London? December 2012, Greater London Authority. 
DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government) (2007) The Callcutt review of 
housebuilding delivery, Communities and Local Government Publications, London. 
DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government) (2012) Section 106 affordable housing 
requirements: review and appeal, April 2013, Department for Communities and Local 
Government, London. 
Drane, J. (2013) The State of Contemporary Property Development Theory, Paper presented at the 
Pacific Rim Real Estate Society (PRRES) Conference, January, 2013. 
DTZ (2009) Assessment of Scope for Affordable Housing Delivery from s106 in a Post Credit Crunch 
Residential Land Market, Final Report to the Homes and Communities Agency, June 2009. 
Ettlinger, N. (2009) Problematizing the presentation of poststructural case study research, or working 
out the crisis of representation in the presentation of empirics, Environment and Planning A, 
41,1017-1019. 
Fellows, R. F. and Liu, A. M. M. (2008) Research Methods for Construction, Blackwell-Wiley: 
Oxford. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) Making Social Science Matter, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
HCA (Homes and Communities Agency) (2012) Reviewing the components of stalled schemes, Topic 
Paper Practice Note T1.2.2, Homes and Communities Agency. 
Healey, P. (1991) Models of the Development Process: a Review. Journal of Property Research, 8, 
219-238. 
Healey, P. (1992). An institutional model of the development process. Journal of Property Research, 
9 (1), 33-44. 
Hughen, K., Ott, S., and Read, D. (2012)  Optimal Phasing and Inventory Decisions for Large-Scale 
Residential Developments, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 45, 888-918. 
KPMG (2008) Study Investigating Financing for Homebuilders, Report for Office for Fair Trading. 
Sayer, A. (1992) Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach Routledge: London and New York. 
26 
 
Titman, S. (1985) Urban land prices under uncertainty, American Economic Review, 75, 505-514. 
White, P. (1986). Land availability, land banking and the price of land for housing: a review of recent 
debates. Land Development Studies, 3, 101-111. 
Yin, R. K. (2008) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th Ed. Sage: London, Delhi and New 
York. 
